TY - JOUR
T1 - American and Canadian engagements in the Afghanistan intervention: a neoclassical realist point of view
AU - Rodriguez Morales, Federman Antonio
N1 - Funding Information:
With these strategies taking place, the American and Canadian FPEs managed to reaffirm their selective COIN strategies. Obtaining funding for the Department of Defense (DoD) to undertake war operations in Afghanistan allowed the American FPE to meet the “clear” and “hold” COIN components. Indeed, the annual average funding to conduct the “clear” COIN component between 2006 and 2011 became US$58,9 billion, representing almost four times higher than that allocated to CT between FY2001/2022 and FY2005. The war funding for this component increased steadily from US$ 17,9 billion in 2006 to US$113,3 billion in 2011. Also, the American FPE obtained legislative appropriations for the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), which was required to meet the “hold” COIN component. Created in FY2004, this budget activity’s annual average was $US 5 billion, peaking at $US 11,6 in FY2011 (SIGAR, , p. 74, OSD, , p. 14). Other budget activities allocated to guarantee the DoD’s operations were Defense Forces, Interior Forces and Related Activities, corresponding to the mentoring and supporting of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and Detainee operations, respectively (SIGAR, , p. 75). The “build” component was funded through appropriated resources to the Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)’s activities in Afghanistan. During the CT period, the “build” funding rose from US$0,8 billion in FY2001/2002 to US$2,8 billion in FY2005 and decreased to US$ 1,1 billion in FY2006. During the COIN period, the “build” funding rose steadily, reaching a peak of US$5,1 billion in FY2010, and dropped to US$4,1 billion in FY2011.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 NPSIA.
PY - 2023/1/2
Y1 - 2023/1/2
N2 - In this article, I aim to explain why and how the United States and Canada adopted similar counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies between 2006 and 2011 to deal with the Afghan irregular warfare. During this time, the United States and Canada adopted with similar levels of intensity the “clear,” “hold,” and “build” COIN objectives; namely: (a) fighting against insurgency, (b) maintaining stabilized areas and training Afghan forces, and (c) helping reconstruct the absent, weak, or corrupt governance in Afghanistan. These similar engagement levels are surprising considering the periods between 2001 and 2005 and 2011 and 2014 when Canadian and American strategies were dissimilar as expected from their relative standing in the international system. I use a process-tracing methodology and neoclassical realism as a theory of foreign policy to unravel this puzzle.
AB - In this article, I aim to explain why and how the United States and Canada adopted similar counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies between 2006 and 2011 to deal with the Afghan irregular warfare. During this time, the United States and Canada adopted with similar levels of intensity the “clear,” “hold,” and “build” COIN objectives; namely: (a) fighting against insurgency, (b) maintaining stabilized areas and training Afghan forces, and (c) helping reconstruct the absent, weak, or corrupt governance in Afghanistan. These similar engagement levels are surprising considering the periods between 2001 and 2005 and 2011 and 2014 when Canadian and American strategies were dissimilar as expected from their relative standing in the international system. I use a process-tracing methodology and neoclassical realism as a theory of foreign policy to unravel this puzzle.
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U2 - 10.1080/11926422.2023.2193419
DO - 10.1080/11926422.2023.2193419
M3 - Artículo de Investigación
SN - 1192-6422
VL - 29
SP - 93
EP - 109
JO - Canadian Foreign Policy Journal
JF - Canadian Foreign Policy Journal
IS - 1
ER -
