American and Canadian engagements in the Afghanistan intervention: a neoclassical realist point of view

Federman Antonio Rodriguez Morales

doi:10.1080/11926422.2023.2193419

American and Canadian engagements in the Afghanistan intervention: a neoclassical realist point of view

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In this article, I aim to explain why and how the United States and Canada adopted similar counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies between 2006 and 2011 to deal with the Afghan irregular warfare. During this time, the United States and Canada adopted with similar levels of intensity the “clear,” “hold,” and “build” COIN objectives; namely: (a) fighting against insurgency, (b) maintaining stabilized areas and training Afghan forces, and (c) helping reconstruct the absent, weak, or corrupt governance in Afghanistan. These similar engagement levels are surprising considering the periods between 2001 and 2005 and 2011 and 2014 when Canadian and American strategies were dissimilar as expected from their relative standing in the international system. I use a process-tracing methodology and neoclassical realism as a theory of foreign policy to unravel this puzzle.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-17
Number of pages	17
Journal	Canadian Foreign Policy Journal
Volume	29
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2023.2193419
State	Published - Apr 4 2023

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Political Science and International Relations

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1080/11926422.2023.2193419

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/11926422.2023.2193419?src=

Cite this

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title = "American and Canadian engagements in the Afghanistan intervention: a neoclassical realist point of view",

abstract = "En este art{\'i}culo pretendo explicar por qu{\'e} y c{\'o}mo Estados Unidos y Canad{\'a} adoptaron estrategias similares de contrainsurgencia (COIN) entre 2006 y 2011 para hacer frente a la guerra irregular afgana. Durante este tiempo, Estados Unidos y Canad{\'a} adoptaron con niveles similares de intensidad los objetivos de la COIN de {"}despejar{"}, {"}mantener{"} y {"}construir{"}; a saber: (a) luchar contra la insurgencia, (b) mantener las zonas estabilizadas y entrenar a las fuerzas afganas, y (c) ayudar a reconstruir la gobernanza ausente, d{\'e}bil o corrupta de Afganist{\'a}n. Estos niveles similares de compromiso resultan sorprendentes si se tienen en cuenta los periodos comprendidos entre 2001 y 2005 y 2011 y 2014, cuando las estrategias canadienses y estadounidenses eran distintas, como cab{\'i}a esperar por su posici{\'o}n relativa en el sistema internacional. Utilizo una metodolog{\'i}a de seguimiento de procesos y el realismo neocl{\'a}sico como teor{\'i}a de la pol{\'i}tica exterior para desentra{\~n}ar este enigma.",

author = "{Rodriguez Morales}, {Federman Antonio}",

note = "Funding Information: With these strategies taking place, the American and Canadian FPEs managed to reaffirm their selective COIN strategies. Obtaining funding for the Department of Defense (DoD) to undertake war operations in Afghanistan allowed the American FPE to meet the “clear” and “hold” COIN components. Indeed, the annual average funding to conduct the “clear” COIN component between 2006 and 2011 became US$58,9 billion, representing almost four times higher than that allocated to CT between FY2001/2022 and FY2005. The war funding for this component increased steadily from US$ 17,9 billion in 2006 to US$113,3 billion in 2011. Also, the American FPE obtained legislative appropriations for the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), which was required to meet the “hold” COIN component. Created in FY2004, this budget activity{\textquoteright}s annual average was $US 5 billion, peaking at $US 11,6 in FY2011 (SIGAR, , p. 74, OSD, , p. 14). Other budget activities allocated to guarantee the DoD{\textquoteright}s operations were Defense Forces, Interior Forces and Related Activities, corresponding to the mentoring and supporting of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and Detainee operations, respectively (SIGAR, , p. 75). The “build” component was funded through appropriated resources to the Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID){\textquoteright}s activities in Afghanistan. During the CT period, the “build” funding rose from US$0,8 billion in FY2001/2002 to US$2,8 billion in FY2005 and decreased to US$ 1,1 billion in FY2006. During the COIN period, the “build” funding rose steadily, reaching a peak of US$5,1 billion in FY2010, and dropped to US$4,1 billion in FY2011. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2023 NPSIA.",

year = "2023",

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doi = "10.1080/11926422.2023.2193419",

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N1 - Funding Information: With these strategies taking place, the American and Canadian FPEs managed to reaffirm their selective COIN strategies. Obtaining funding for the Department of Defense (DoD) to undertake war operations in Afghanistan allowed the American FPE to meet the “clear” and “hold” COIN components. Indeed, the annual average funding to conduct the “clear” COIN component between 2006 and 2011 became US$58,9 billion, representing almost four times higher than that allocated to CT between FY2001/2022 and FY2005. The war funding for this component increased steadily from US$ 17,9 billion in 2006 to US$113,3 billion in 2011. Also, the American FPE obtained legislative appropriations for the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), which was required to meet the “hold” COIN component. Created in FY2004, this budget activity’s annual average was $US 5 billion, peaking at $US 11,6 in FY2011 (SIGAR, , p. 74, OSD, , p. 14). Other budget activities allocated to guarantee the DoD’s operations were Defense Forces, Interior Forces and Related Activities, corresponding to the mentoring and supporting of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and Detainee operations, respectively (SIGAR, , p. 75). The “build” component was funded through appropriated resources to the Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)’s activities in Afghanistan. During the CT period, the “build” funding rose from US$0,8 billion in FY2001/2002 to US$2,8 billion in FY2005 and decreased to US$ 1,1 billion in FY2006. During the COIN period, the “build” funding rose steadily, reaching a peak of US$5,1 billion in FY2010, and dropped to US$4,1 billion in FY2011. Publisher Copyright: © 2023 NPSIA.

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N2 - En este artículo pretendo explicar por qué y cómo Estados Unidos y Canadá adoptaron estrategias similares de contrainsurgencia (COIN) entre 2006 y 2011 para hacer frente a la guerra irregular afgana. Durante este tiempo, Estados Unidos y Canadá adoptaron con niveles similares de intensidad los objetivos de la COIN de "despejar", "mantener" y "construir"; a saber: (a) luchar contra la insurgencia, (b) mantener las zonas estabilizadas y entrenar a las fuerzas afganas, y (c) ayudar a reconstruir la gobernanza ausente, débil o corrupta de Afganistán. Estos niveles similares de compromiso resultan sorprendentes si se tienen en cuenta los periodos comprendidos entre 2001 y 2005 y 2011 y 2014, cuando las estrategias canadienses y estadounidenses eran distintas, como cabía esperar por su posición relativa en el sistema internacional. Utilizo una metodología de seguimiento de procesos y el realismo neoclásico como teoría de la política exterior para desentrañar este enigma.

AB - En este artículo pretendo explicar por qué y cómo Estados Unidos y Canadá adoptaron estrategias similares de contrainsurgencia (COIN) entre 2006 y 2011 para hacer frente a la guerra irregular afgana. Durante este tiempo, Estados Unidos y Canadá adoptaron con niveles similares de intensidad los objetivos de la COIN de "despejar", "mantener" y "construir"; a saber: (a) luchar contra la insurgencia, (b) mantener las zonas estabilizadas y entrenar a las fuerzas afganas, y (c) ayudar a reconstruir la gobernanza ausente, débil o corrupta de Afganistán. Estos niveles similares de compromiso resultan sorprendentes si se tienen en cuenta los periodos comprendidos entre 2001 y 2005 y 2011 y 2014, cuando las estrategias canadienses y estadounidenses eran distintas, como cabía esperar por su posición relativa en el sistema internacional. Utilizo una metodología de seguimiento de procesos y el realismo neoclásico como teoría de la política exterior para desentrañar este enigma.

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DO - 10.1080/11926422.2023.2193419

M3 - Artículo

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JO - Canadian Foreign Policy Journal

JF - Canadian Foreign Policy Journal

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ER -

American and Canadian engagements in the Afghanistan intervention: a neoclassical realist point of view

Abstract

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UN SDGs

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