Agents of neoliberalism? High Courts, Legal preferences and Rights in Latin America

Research output: Chapter in Book/InformChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

Abstract

Constitutional courts, like in de pen dent central banks, were seen by the in-ternational financial institutions and aid agencies fueling judicial reform in Latin Amer i ca in the late 1980s and early 1990s as crucial to neoliberal eco-nomic development. Safe from the vicissitudes of representative democracy by virtue of their design, high courts were deemed ideally located to pro-vide much-needed guarantees of legal predictability. Strengthening courts and the judicial system in general was seen as vital to promoting legal sta-bility, providing access to justice for investors, increasing effectiveness, and safeguarding the neoliberal model (Carothers 2001; Rodríguez Garavito 2011). In this context, wide-ranging reforms often provided for the cre-ation of constitutional tribunals where none existed or for the empowerment of those already existing.Some of these new or recen
Translated title of the contribution¿Agentes del neoliberalismo? Altos tribunales, preferencias legales y derechos en América Latina
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLatin America Since the Left Turn
EditorsTulia G. Falleti , Emilio A. Parrado
Place of PublicationEstados Unidos
PublisherUniversity of Pennsylvania
ChapterChapter 10
Pages214-240
ISBN (Print)9780812249712
DOIs
StatePublished - 2017

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