Project Details
Description
Current competition policy has considered vertical restrains to be broadly anticompetitive as they allow a manufacturer to control the decision of downstream firms. Vertical control such as resale price maintenance, tie-ins, and exclusive territories are regarded as per-se prohibitions as they facilitate the abuse of the dominant position by a dominant firm. However, little
attention has been paid to situations using such restrains in a research environment.
We consider a continuous-time innovation race between two upstream firms competing to be the first to sell an innovation to downstream firms. Innovation is uncertain, and potential innovations are not sure about the feasibility of the innovation they are working on. We argue that vertical restraints may be welfare-enhancing to the extent that they may provide incentives to innovate
attention has been paid to situations using such restrains in a research environment.
We consider a continuous-time innovation race between two upstream firms competing to be the first to sell an innovation to downstream firms. Innovation is uncertain, and potential innovations are not sure about the feasibility of the innovation they are working on. We argue that vertical restraints may be welfare-enhancing to the extent that they may provide incentives to innovate
Layman's description
Current competition policy has considered vertical restrains to be broadly anticompetitive as they allow a manufacturer to control the decision of downstream firms. Vertical control such as resale price maintenance, tie-ins, and exclusive territories are regarded as per-se prohibitions as they facilitate the abuse of the dominant position by a dominant firm. However, little
attention has been paid to situations using such restrains in a research environment.
We consider a continuous-time innovation race between two upstream firms competing to be the first to sell an innovation to downstream firms. Innovation is uncertain, and potential innovations are not sure about the feasibility of the innovation they are working on. We argue that vertical restraints may be welfare-enhancing to the extent that they may provide incentives to innovate
attention has been paid to situations using such restrains in a research environment.
We consider a continuous-time innovation race between two upstream firms competing to be the first to sell an innovation to downstream firms. Innovation is uncertain, and potential innovations are not sure about the feasibility of the innovation they are working on. We argue that vertical restraints may be welfare-enhancing to the extent that they may provide incentives to innovate
Keywords
Innovation, Vertical Controls
| Status | Active |
|---|---|
| Effective start/end date | 5/16/22 → 12/1/23 |
UN Sustainable Development Goals
In 2015, UN member states agreed to 17 global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure prosperity for all. This project contributes towards the following SDG(s):
Main Funding Source
- Installed Capacity (Academic Unit)
Location
- Bogotá D.C.
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